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  Abstract 
The current crisis is not only one of financial markets, but also of macroeconomics. Leading 
scholars call for a paradigm shift away from dynamic general equilibrium models, though 
some argue that the profession's arsenal already contains the tools and historical lessons 
needed to deal with such crises. Taking this view to the limit, this note demonstrates that 
the workhorse models of undergraduate macroeconomics not only permit a refined view 
and classification of financial crises. These models also identify scenarios under which either 
policymakers would be ill advised to follow conventional prescriptions, or full-scale 
depressions loom that cannot be fought by means of fiscal or monetary policy alone. 
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In Hans Christian Andersen's short tale, it takes a child's innocence and courage to cry out loud that 
the emperor is naked. In the real world, it took a crisis with all the ingredients of a perfect storm to 
sober our appreciation for how macroeconomics has developed, and to encourage well-recognized 
macroeconomists to state openly and forcefully what most had long dared to whisper under their 
breath only   for fear of being ridiculed by their peers. As our storyteller explains: "Not only was the 
material so beautiful, but the clothes made from it had the special power of being invisible to everyone 
who was stupid." In the same vein, questioning the empirical relevance or usefulness of real business 
cycle theory and, later on, of dynamic general equilibrium modelling, daring to admit that one was not 
totally smitten by these approaches' logical coherence and formal elegance, felt tantamount to coming 
clean that one was simply not smart enough to be a functional macroeconomist. 
The crisis served as a wake-up call that triggered some serious soul searching, and the tables 
could  be  turning  now.  Many  of  the  profession's  brightest  minds,  including  Acemoglu  (2009),       
Buiter  (2009),  Eichengreen  (2009),  de  Grauwe  (2009),  Krugman  (2009),  Stiglitz  (2009)  and          
Wyplosz (2009), are arguing and lobbying for a rethinking. Some call for a radical departure from 
previous paths, for a new paradigm that discards the log-linearized models of late, with their focus on 
small, digestible shocks around well-defined, stable equilibria from which the economy only departs 
during  short-lived  V-shaped  recessions  (Buiter  (2009)).  Other  voices  sound  more  moderate.           
Eichengreen (2009) argues that it was less insufficient knowledge than an inadequate comprehension 
of existing knowledge that contributed to the dismal picture conveyed by macroeconomics at a time 
when the public yearned for guidance as to both what was in store after the crisis had erupted, and 
what should be done to prevent the worst. 
A new paradigm for macroeconomics appears years away and uncertain, given that it may take 
considerable resources to remedy many of the diagnosed defects, and that there may be reluctance to 
write off a substantial part of acquired human capital as sunk cost. For now, and for some time to 
come, we will therefore have to make do with the knowledge that exists and can be shown to be useful 
in making us understand the current crisis. Pushing Eichengreen (2009) to the limit, this note argues 
that undergraduate macroeconomics, creatively applied and properly enriched with elements that were 
already introduced in John Maynard Keynes' times   but had faded from our radar along with the his-
torical lessons taught by the Great Depression   can teach us a great deal about the current crisis and 
offer some preparation for future financial crises. 
We begin by introducing the main tools needed for this endeavour. These tools consist of a 
generalized interpretation of the IS-LM model, in which we distinguish between the money market and 
the capital market, introduce risk premiums, and show how these interact with a possibly dormant 
liquidity trap. The results derived there are fairly straightforward and need little elaboration. This is 
not the case when we look at the small open economy, which is done in two steps. First, we explain 4 
 
that there is no such thing as a financial crisis. Such crises come in many different forms. Second, we 
analyze crisis contagion and policy options in a world where a small open economy, characterized by 
a Mundell-Fleming model with liquidity traps and risk premiums, interacts with the rest of the world. 
The results generated in this section are not part of the ruling orthodoxy and are the key contribution 
of this note. 
 
 
2. The IS-LM model in crisis guise 
 
The IS-LM model splits the economy's demand side into a goods market and a money market. Interest 
rates play a key role in both of them. As long as we let perfect competition keep banks from charging 
a mark-up over capital costs when they extend credit to firms, and as long as we ignore risk by postu-
lating certainty, there is no need to distinguish between interest rates in the two markets, and the same 
interest rate determines the demand for money and investment demand. Once we permit the possibility 
of bankruptcies among banks and firms in times of financial crises, however, distinguishing between 
interest rates in the money market iMM and in the capital market iCM becomes crucial. We also have to 
take into account that uncertainty makes money and investment demands depend on expected interest 
rates E(iMM) and E(iCM). These are determined by subtracting the risk premiums rMM  and rCM that 
households and banks require as compensation for imperfect trust in banks and firms, respectively, 
from the agreed nominal interest rates. Thus E(iMM) = iMM   rMM  and E(iCM) = iCM   rCM . Finally, let-
ting the (risk free) mark up of bank lending rates over capital costs be zero, capital and money market 
interest rates are related via iMM = E(iCM) = iCM   rCM . With these modifications the equilibrium condi-
tions in the money and in the goods market, the LM and IS curves, are embedded in the functions 
 




(2)  Y = C[Y   T(Y)] + I(iMM + rCM  ) + G    with    
 
where M is the supply of and L the demand for money, P the price level, Y real income, C consump-
tion, G government spending and T denotes taxes. 
  Let the dashed curves in Figure 1 mark the situation before the subprime crisis started, say in 
the year 2007. The economy is in a full-employment equilibrium in point A at potential income Y*. 
Note the horizontal segment of the LM curve, already discussed in Hicks' (1937) work. It is a dormant 
liquidity trap, and once the economy moves onto that segment, monetary policy becomes ineffective. 5 
 
This is considered an unlikely exception these days, though Krugman (1998, 2000) gave Japan's lost 
decade in the 1990s a liquidity trap interpretation. 
When the storm began in the U.S. housing market in early 2007, one bank after the other col-
lapsed or needed to be rescued, and households did not know which institution would be next, they 
required a risk premium and, thus, a higher interest rate for keeping their money in the bank. The en-
suing upward shift of the LM curve would have driven money market rates up and the economy into a 
recession in point B'. Once it was clear that a major downturn was on its way, banks were unable to 
tell with sufficient certainty which firms would weather the storm and which ones would not. Banks 
thus felt compelled to attach a sizable risk premium to the interest rates they offered firms that were 
seeking loans.
3 This drove capital market rates way above money market rates, which is tantamount to 
a downward shift of the IS curve in a diagram with money market rates on the ordinate. As a partial 
effect, such a confidence crisis in the capital market would have driven the economy into a recession 
in point B''. Both confidence crises together, in the banking sector and in the corporate sector, re-
enforced each other and led the economy into a major recession in point B. 
 
Figure 1 near here 
 
The insights to be gained from the IS-LM model with risk premiums are fairly standard. During finan-
cial crises, fiscal and monetary policy may work as usual. And if a major crisis sidelines monetary 
policy in a liquidity trap, fiscal policy can step in. The only result not covered in standard undergradu-
ate macroeconomics is that liquidity traps may occur significantly above the zero interest rate bound, 
and may, thus, emerge more often than conventionally thought. More interesting results that cannot be 
traced back to Keynes and the subsequent literature, and which are, if not novel, at least not  common 
knowledge, are obtained when we look at how financial crises affect small individual economies. 
 
 
3. There is no such thing as a financial crisis 
 
How a financial crisis affects an individual country and what this country can do to combat its effects  
may crucially depend on the type of financial crisis it is dealing with. Instead of discussing this in the 
abstract, consider the classification proposed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 near here 
 
                                                            
3 This risk-premium interpretation is compatible with the notion of a credit crunch that was often proposed during the current 
crisis. In fact, the latter may be considered a special case of the former. In the credit crunch view risk premiums have become 
so high that loans are virtually unavailable for major segments of the market. 6 
 
From the perspective of a relatively small country, the two major determinants of how its economy 
will be affected by a financial crisis are, first, whether it permits flexible or enforces fixed exchange 
rates versus the rest of the world and, second, whether the crisis is global in the sense that financial 
markets worldwide are affected, including the small country or not, or domestic in the sense that for-
eign financial markets remain healthy. These scenarios provide us with six different cases in Table 1. 
Each case carries two sub-scenarios labelled A and B, depending on whether the crisis originates in 
the money or in the capital market. 
Before we scare readers, we should note that many of these scenarios yield routine results. 
Rather than grinding through all possible cases, the discussion of which we may leave to undergradu-
ate instructors who aspire to completely cover this topic, or as finger exercises for students   we focus 
on scenarios that provide the most exciting results
4; results that are either new or have long been out of 
the profession's sight and mind. These scenarios are highlighted in Table 1. 
 
 
4. Traps and new results for fiscal and monetary policy effectiveness in small open economies 
 
We start with a global crisis that affects financial markets in all countries at the same time. Let the 
world be composed of a small open economy, represented in the left panel in Figures 2-4 by means of 
a Mundell-Fleming diagram, and a homogenous rest of the world, which the individual country is too 
small to affect, represented by an IS-LM diagram in the panel on the right. 
 
Figure 2 near here 
 
Before we can start to discuss crises, we need to introduce and comment on the international capital 
market, which now links the individual country to the rest of the world. When capital is fully mobile, 
equilibrium in the international capital market only obtains when expected returns at home E(iCM) 
equal those abroad E(iCM
W). Assuming that the exchange rate is not expected to change, we get iCM   
rCM  = iCM
W  rCM
W. If we want to stick with measuring the two countries' money market interest rates 
iMM  and  iMM




W into the above arbitrage condition to obtain the equilibrium condition iMM = iMM
W.
5 
This is represented by a horizontal capital market or foreign exchange market equilibrium line, the FE 
curve.
6 
                                                            
4 For a complete coverage of the scenarios suggested by Table 1 and targeted at undergraduate students, see Gärtner and  
Jung (2009). 
5 If we want to feature the capital market interest rate on the ordinate instead, the horizontal FE curve is positioned at:        
iCM  = iCM
W + (rCM  rCM
W). In this case the FE curve moves when a financial crisis erupts, while IS stays put.  
6 It may seem puzzling that we still have the familiar equilibrium condition iMM = iMM
W, even though the a financial crisis has 
generated a host of uncertainty along with risk premiums at home and abroad. The explanation is that this condition refers to 7 
 
Suppose now that exchange rates are flexible and financial crises erupt in all countries and all 
financial markets at the same time. This drives the rest of the world not only into recession but also 
possibly into a liquidity trap, as assumed in the right-hand panel of Figure 2, which simply replicates 
Figure 1. The increase in global money market rates observed in the rest of the world shifts the small 
open economy's FE curve up. If the loss of confidence in domestic banks matches the loss in the rest 
of the world, the individual country may end up in a liquidity trap as well C but in a very special one. 
In this case, the interest rate at which the liquidity demand for money becomes perfectly elastic equals 
the world interest rate, i.e., the horizontal segment of the LM curve sits on the FE curve.
7 
Now, let falling world income and the emergence of a sizable risk premium in the world capi-
tal market shift the small open economy's IS curve into ISB, driving the economy into a liquidity trap at 
point B. Contrary to policy recipes under normal circumstances, but a well-known property of liquid-
ity traps, monetary policy does not work. Also contrary to standard recipes, and foremost to many 
recommendations made during the current crisis, fiscal policy does work. And it works big time, 
showering demand on the domestic economy through a full multiplier effect. The reason is that with 
the market being drowned in liquidity, added government spending may be financed without driving 
the interest rate up. There is no inflow of foreign capital and, therefore, no crowding out via exchange 
rate appreciation. 
Thus, fiscal stimulus packages work, but their effect may be limited. In Figure 2, once the 
economy reaches point B', where income still falls far short of potential income, fiscal policy becomes 
ineffective. Any further spending hikes would be crowded out by exchange rate appreciation and a 
reduction in net exports. Since we are at the edge of a liquidity trap and monetary policy is ineffective 
still, economic policy has run out of options. Such a situation may be called a perfect trap. 
Luckily, fiscal and monetary policies only fail when used in isolation. A coordinated effort 
that would do the trick requires the central bank to (ineffectively) increase the money supply, shifting 
LM to the right and, thus, widening the range at which fiscal policy works. Additionally, the govern-
ment  must  accompany  this  increase  in  money  supply  with  an  increase  in  spending,  which  is  not 
crowded out any longer. Such a coordinated mix of expansionary monetary and fiscal policy could 
indeed end the recession. 
We now turn to asymmetric scenarios in which confidence crises erupt exclusively in domes-
tic financial markets. Figure 3 looks at flexible exchange rates. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the money market interest rates iMM and iMM
W. It thus states that capital costs must be the same across borders. Since there is 
no mark-up over these costs, these interest rates ensure that expected returns in the capital markets at home and abroad are 
the same. Interest rates in the capital markets may differ, of course, and they may reflect differences in risk premiums in the 
capital market. Risk premiums in the money market are of no concern for international investors, since these affect and are 
affected by strictly domestic money holdings only. 
7 When risk premiums in domestic and foreign money markets differ significantly, so that the horizontal segment of the LM 
does not sit on the FE curve, the situation is qualitatively the same as if there was only a financial crisis in the small open 
economy. We will examine this further below. 8 
 
Figure 3 near here 
 
 
Suppose emerging risk premiums shift the domestic LM curve from the dashed into the solid position. 
This drives the economy into a recession in point B'. The IS curve moves into the solid position as 
well, independently of where it had been shifted by risk premiums that may have emerged in the capi-
tal market because the flexible exchange rate will do the rest. In this situation, monetary policy works 
to fight the recession. 
But if the risk premium in the money market grows so large that the horizontal segment of the 
LM curve moves higher than the FE curve (see the dotted position), the situation becomes serious. 
Now domestic interest rates are permanently too high compared to the world interest rate. Thus, the 
exchange rate appreciates continuously, moving the IS curve and income ever further to the left. Fiscal 
policy may slow this process or reverse it temporarily, but it is fighting windmills. A lasting escape 
from the recession can only be accomplished by rebuilding confidence in the domestic money market 
to lower the risk premium and shift the LM curve down.
8 
The same case under fixed exchange rates is shown in Figure 4. When falling confidence 
shifts the LM curve moderately, say into the solid position, familiar mechanisms that force the central 
bank to purchase foreign currency shift this new LM curve to the right until it passes through A. But 
again, a substantial rise in the money market risk premium that shifts LM into the dotted position gen-
erates instability on the economy's demand-side. In this case, the central bank must intervene and shift 
LM to the right. This intervention casts the economy into a liquidity trap in point B'' which denotes a 
disequilibrium, though, because home interest rates remain stuck above world interest rates, so that the 
money supply needs to be increased further. This process will even continue after the stimulus pack-
ages ends the recession. Again, a lasting stabilisation can only be achieved after confidence in banks 
increases to a sufficient extent. 
 
 
Figure 4 near here 
 
 
                                                            
8 The overall macroeconomic equilibrium can also disappear when the crisis in the world's money markets is basically sym-
metric, as sketched in Figure 2. All that is needed to throw the small country's economy into a full-scale depression in that 
case is an uneven timing that lets the crisis in the domestic money market unfold just a little bit earlier or quicker than in the 
rest of the world. As soon as the risk premium in the domestic money market exceeds the rest of the world's money market 
interest rate, the home currency appreciates in leaps and drives aggregate demand and income to very low levels. The really 
bad news is that this process does not reverse itself when the crisis (i.e., the risk premium) in the rest of the world catches up. 
Thus a small country may be thrown into an outright depression not only by an asymmetric financial crisis that affects its 
banking industry more than banks in the rest of the world but also when a crisis that is basically symmetrical evolves at a 
slightly different pace. Note that in both cases of a macroeconomic disequilibrium the counterintuitive result obtained here is 
that it is an unfolding crisis in world's money markets that makes the domestic crisis less severe. 9 
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
 
In Hans Christian Andersen's tale, it is neither the peasants nor other ordinary people who are caught 
parading in the nude. It is the emperor. In macroeconomics, it is not what is typically taught in the 
undergraduate curriculum, often with flinching enthusiasm and conviction, that the crisis found lack-
ing. It is the oftentimes narcissistic exercises in applied mathematics, consistency and formal elegance 
that we sold to more than one generation of bright and aspiring graduate students under the label mac-
roeconomics.  
The commoners' clothes may be of coarse material and questionable style, patched up, and too 
shabby to get them admitted to the emperor's ballroom. But they serve a basic purpose, reliably so, as 
do many of the workhorse models used in undergraduate classrooms. IS-LM and Mundell-Fleming 
models have well-known limitations. And they certainly do not explain what started the crisis in the 
first place, how bubbles can be prevented, or what regulations the financial industry needs. But they 
do offer a very useful bird's-eye perspective of the macroeconomic consequences of financial crises, 
and they help to sort out the main policy issues. 
Our discussion emphasized that high calibre financial crises often come in conjunction with a 
liquidity trap that cannot be easily identified when banks are part of the problem. Such traps lack the 
characteristic feature of very low interest rates, and households may start to withdraw funds on a mas-
sive scale even at strictly positive rates. In addition, conventional wisdom regarding policy choices 
may not apply. Contrary to what generations of students learned, expansionary fiscal policy may be 
the only remedy   even for a small open economy with flexible exchange rates   given that there is no 
more crowding out of additional government spending via exchange rate appreciation. But this is only 
true up to a point, because we also showed that under certain conditions liquidity traps in small open 
economies might morph into perfect traps. In such situations, neither monetary nor fiscal policy works 
when used alone, and a coordinated expansionary effort by the central bank and the government is 
called for. Finally, when the domestic banking sector is hit disproportionally hard by a confidence 
crisis, compared to the rest of the world, this may even destabilize the economy and trigger a run into 
a full scale depression (or L-shaped recession). Then, conventional fiscal and monetary policy meas-
ures may only provide temporary relief. Any lasting solution must address the roots of the confidence 
crisis. 
  Apart from these specific results, this note has a number of general implications and uses: 
  It is a defence of macroeconomics. In line with Eichengreen's (2009) appraisal, and pushing 
his view to the extreme, it shows that even apprentices of macroeconomics have tools at their disposal 
that enable them to be active and constructive participants in discussions of the current crisis. 
  It helps and encourages undergraduate instructors to use the 2007 subprime crisis as a case 
study and, thus, emphasizes that macroeconomics is an applied science which makes real world devel-
opments and policy discussions more transparent. 10 
 
  Finally, it may provide guidance as to where macroeconomics should go. Not by claiming that 
the past is the future. But by pointing to building blocks and properties that a new or renewed para-
digm in macroeconomics should include. In this respect, it is also a warning against tendencies to drop 
the money market from macroeconomic models   a trend that has gained momentum and arrived in 
the undergraduate curriculum.
9 Such models reduce the money market to an interest rate that is set by 
the central bank, without explicit consideration of the demand for and the supply of money. Looking at 
interest rates alone during the current crisis would have conveyed the impression that central banks 
were merely passive bystanders when, in fact, ther e was frantic activity that is only revealed in the 
unprecedented growth of monetary aggregates. Rather than discarding the money market, a more 
comprehensive treatment of the monetary sector is called for that pays attention to the interaction b e-
tween the money and capital markets, and that does not lose sight of the things that may go wrong. 
   
                                                            
9 An early example is Romer (2000). More recent ones are Bofinger, Mayer and Wollmershäuser (2009) or Carlin and 




Acemoglu, Daron (2009). The crisis of 2008: structural lessons for and from economics, CEPR, Policy 
Insight no. 28, January 2009. 
 
Bofinger, Peter, Eric Mayer and Timo Wollmershäuser (2009). Teaching New Keynesian Open Econ-
omy Macroeconomics at the Intermediate Level, Journal of Economic Education 40 (1), 80-102. 
 
Buiter, Willem (2009). The unfortunate uselessness of most 'state of the art' academic monetary eco-
nomics, Willem Buiter’s Maverecon Homepage, 3 March. 
 
Carlin, Wendy, and David Soskice (2005). The 3-Equation New Keynesian Model   A Graphical Ex-
position, The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics 1. 
 
Eichengreen, Barry (2009). The Last Temptation of Risk, The National Interest, May/June. 
 
Gärtner, Manfred, and Florian Jung (2009). The macroeconomics of financial crises: How risk premi-
ums, liquidity traps and perfect traps affect policy options. University of St. Gallen, Department of 
Economics, Discussion paper no. 2009-15, July. 
 
de Grauwe, Paul (2009). Top-down versus bottom-up macroeconomics, VoxEurope, 19 November. 
 
Hicks, John R. (1937). Mr. Keynes and the "Classics"; A suggested interpretation, Econometrica 5(2), 
147-159. 
 
Krugman, Paul (1998). It's baaack: Japan's slump and the return of the liquidity trap, Brookings Pa-
pers On Economic Activity 2, 137-205. 
 
Krugman, Paul (2000). Thinking about the liquidity trap, Journal of the Japanese and International 
Economies 14, 221-237. 
 
Krugman, Paul (2009). How Did Economists Get It So Wrong?, New York Times Magazine, 2 Sep-
tember. 
 
Romer, David (2000). Keynesian Macroeconomics without the LM Curve, Journal of Economic Per-
spectives 14(2), 149-169. 
 12 
 
Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2009). The current Economic Crisis and Lessons for Economic Theory, Eastern 
Economic Journal 35(3). 
 
Wyplosz, Charles (2009). Macroeconomics after the Crisis: Dealing with the Tobin Curse, The Wal-
ter-Adolf-Jöhr Lecture, 15 May. 
   13 
 
 














includes  small  open 
economy 
1A  1B  2A  2B 
does  not  include 
small open economy 
3A  3B  4A  4B 
Domestic crisis 
5A  5B  6A  6B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 14 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 16 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 17 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 